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Abstract
Essays in Industrial Organization and the Economics of Education
Suk Joon Son
2021
This dissertation includes three chapters on industrial organization and the economics of edu-
cation, centered around New York City’s public high school choice procedure. In the first chapter, I
document evidence of informational frictions in the usage of the public high school choice in New
York City and the patterns of racial disparities. The second chapter develops a model of applica-
tion behavior and considers its identification. The third chapter estimates a model of high school
applications and uses it to analyze the impacts of New York City’s high school choice procedure.
Centralized school choice procedures are gaining wider adoption, based in part on theoretical
results promising desirable properties such as matching stability and strategy-proofness. However,
these theoretical results are limited in two dimensions. First, they do not directly address distri-
butional outcomes, such as racial integration and equity, that parents and policymakers are often
interested in. Second, although they have been argued to indirectly assist in achieving distributional
goals, they rely on idealized assumptions regarding the matching mechanism and information.
In the first chapter, I use the administrative data provided by the NYC DOE for the 2016–2017
academic year to provide evidence that suggests the applicants in New York City are not aware
of all the available schools. The evidence also suggests that applicants take the admission proba-
bilities into account when they apply and that they may not understand certain properties of the
mechanism. I then document evidence of racial disparities with respect to the schools that the
students live close to, apply to, and are matched to.
In the second chapter, I develop a model of application behavior that allows applicants to con-
sider only a limited set of school options and to have incorrect beliefs about admission chances.
Rich information in applicants’ rank-ordered lists of schools, coupled with certain restrictions,
allows identification of the model. For instance, while a lack of consideration may affect which
schools are listed, it cannot affect how the listed schools are ranked. Furthermore, while strategic
behavior to shift admission chances may affect the rankings, it cannot affect which schools are
listed unless the list length constraint binds. Identification is also aided by an assumption that cer-
tain observables, such as the page on which a school is listed in the school directory, can affect the
consideration set but not preferences. I formalize these intuitive ideas with sufficient conditions for
nonparametric identification.
In the third chapter, I estimate a model of students’ application behavior, which is a paramet-
ric version of the model considered in the second chapter. I also analyze the impact of New York
City’s 2016-2017 school choice on integration and equity of welfare across different demographic
groups. I simulate the estimated model under different counterfactual scenarios to measure the
contributions of different factors: students’ residential locations, preferences, limited considera-
tion sets, admission priority groups, and the screening policies of the schools. The model also
allows me to quantify matching stability. Results show that, while school choice slightly integrates
race and improves welfare across all races, these gains and the stability of the school assignments
are compromised by deviations from fully informed behavior. Schools’ admission priorities and
screening policies contribute to racial segregation and tend to place Asian and White students in
their preferred schools.
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Introduction
School choice policies aim to mitigate the effect of students’ residential locations on educational
opportunities by allowing students access to schools beyond their neighborhoods. One version of
these policies is to use a centralized assignment mechanism, often motivated by results from eco-
nomic theory, such as those that guarantee stability, efficiency, or strategy-proofness.1 However,
the impacts of these mechanisms are still debated. The theoretical results depend on the assump-
tion that the applicants make well-informed and rational choices.2 They also assume ideal versions
of the mechanisms that often differ from those implemented in practice.3 Furthermore, while many
policymakers regard distributive goals such as racial integration and equity to be among the pri-
mary objectives regarding school allocations, the theoretical results do not directly address these
goals. Therefore, the impact of centralized school choice on a variety of outcomes is an empirical
question.
My dissertation is centered on analyzing the centralized high school choice procedure in New
York City (NYC). In the first chapter, I document evidence that there are substantial informational
frictions in this procedure, using the administrative data from the NYC Department of Educa-
tion (DOE). I further provide evidence of racial disparities with respect to neighborhood schools,
applied schools, and matched schools. In the second chapter, I develop a model of application be-
1See, e.g., Gale and Shapley (1962), Shapley and Scarf (1974), Ergin (2002), and Abdulkadiroğlu and Sönmez
(2003). Such centralized mechanisms are used in, for example, New York City, Chicago, Boston, New Orleans, Paris,
Spain, and Romania (Abdulkadiroglu et al., 2017; Fack et al., 2019).
2See, e.g., Hassidim et al. (2017), Li (2017), and Fack et al. (2019).
3See, e.g., Abdulkadiroğlu et al. (2005), Haeringer and Klijn (2009), and Calsamiglia et al. (2010).
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havior that allows for two types of optimization frictions: applicants may consider only a limited
set of schools, and they may have incorrect beliefs about admission chances. I provide sufficient
conditions that ensure the model is nonparametrically identified using the type of rank-ordered
choice data typically available from centralized school choice systems. In the third chapter, I es-
timate a model of students’ application behavior, which is a parametric version of that considered
in the second chapter, and analyze the impact of school choice on integration and equity of wel-
fare across different demographic groups. I further measure the contributions of different factors:
students’ residential locations, preferences, limited consideration sets, and schools’ priorities and
rankings over the students. The model also allows me to measure the contribution of strategic
reporting and quantify matching stability.
NYC’s high school assignment procedure allocates approximately 80,000 students to more
than 700 school programs each year, forming a part of the largest centralized school choice system
in the United States. The procedure matches students to schools based on the students’ submitted
rank-ordered lists of school programs and the school programs’ priorities or rankings over the
students. The assignment mechanism is a version of the Deferred Acceptance (DA) mechanism,
which in theory guarantees matching stability and strategy-proofness under idealized assumptions.
However, theory promises little about important distributional outcomes such as diversity in
schools and equity in education, which NYC DOE regards as its top priorities (NYC DOE, 2020a,b,c).
Potentially reflecting this tension, students and others have raised concerns about the diversity in
its schools and the equity across demographic groups.4 Consistent with the concerns, I document
that minority students tend to be matched to low-performing schools.
Moreover, even the theoretically predicted properties—matching stability and report truthfulness—
may not hold in practice. These properties rely on the assumptions that applicants are fully in-
formed and rational and that the canonical version of the DA mechanism is implemented. However,
NYC’s DA mechanism deviates from its canonical version,5 and truthful reporting of preferences
4See, e.g., https://gothamist.com/news/wheres-our-mayor-nyc-students-rally-
against-school-segregation
5The students are constrained in the number of school programs that they can list, and there are reassignments
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cannot be guaranteed to be weakly dominant. Therefore, there are situations where an applicant
must assess admission chances in order to strategize optimally. In my first chapter, I provide evi-
dence that suggests students’ reports are affected by admission chances in addition to their prefer-
ences. Evidence also suggests that applicants may not understand the properties of the mechanism
and take admission chances into account even under situations where such behavior is weakly
dominated. Furthermore, because more than 700 school programs are allocated through the mech-
anism, applicants are unlikely to be aware of every option. I find that students are significantly less
likely to apply to the schools listed in the later pages of NYC’s school directory, suggesting that
they are not fully aware of all schools.
Imperfections in the applicants’ knowledge or in matching mechanisms can have distributional
consequences. Failure of strategy-proofness may undermine fairness; students with lower socioe-
conomic backgrounds may be less likely to understand the exact properties of NYC’s DA mecha-
nism. Therefore, they may have more difficulties in formulating an optimal report.6 They may also
be less informed about higher-quality schools.7 I document evidence of racial disparities in NYC’s
choice in the first chapter.
A model that does not allow for frictions in application behavior forces the researcher to in-
terpret any observed behavior under school choice as optimal behavior in terms of the applicants’
preferences, potentially biasing the results in favor of the use of school choice. Furthermore, a
frictionless model attributes differences in the choice patterns across different demographic groups
to differences in preferences when, in fact, they may be caused by differences in frictions. On the
other hand, a model that allows for frictions enables the researcher to disentangle the contributions
of different factors—including optimization frictions—to the observed outcomes and to provide
guidance on possible policy interventions.
Therefore, in my second chapter, I consider a model of applications where I allow each appli-
following the initial assignment procedure.
6See, e.g., Pathak and Sönmez (2008), Sattin-Bajaj (2016), and Basteck and Mantovani (2018).
7See, e.g., Sattin-Bajaj (2016) and Corcoran et al. (2018).
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cant to consider only a limited set of school options and to have incorrect beliefs about equilibrium
admission chances. An applicant may fail to consider some school because she is not aware of the
school or feels she can never be admitted to the school. Consideration of a school is determined
by a latent variable whose distribution depends on the observables. Even if the applicant considers
a school, her beliefs about admission chances could still be incorrect. The beliefs about admission
chances are determined by the applicant’s expectations about her admission scores relative to the
schools’ cutoffs for admission.8 Such specification allows for misunderstanding of the matching
mechanism. I assume each student maximizes her expected utility with frictions in consideration
and in assessments about admission chances.
My second chapter also demonstrates how rich information in students’ rank-ordered lists of
schools, coupled with certain restrictions, allows me to identify the model. For instance, while a
lack of consideration may affect which schools are listed, it cannot affect how the listed schools
will be ranked. Furthermore, while strategic behavior reflecting applicants’ beliefs about admission
chances may affect the rankings, it cannot affect which schools are listed unless the list length
constraint binds. Identification is also aided by an assumption that certain observables, such as
the page on which a school is listed in NYC’s school directory, can affect the consideration set
but not preferences. Another assumption that aids identification is that some students have a set
of schools (e.g., noncompetitive schools close to home) that they will surely consider. I formalize
these intuitive ideas with sufficient conditions for nonparametric identification, which demonstrate
that the identification does not depend on functional form assumptions and clarify the role of each
assumption and source of data variation.
In the third chapter, after having estimated the model, I consider theoretical predictions under
idealized implementations: stability of matching and optimality and truthfulness of students’ re-
ports. The estimated model allows me to quantify stability by measuring the prevalence of justified
envy;9 a stable matching does not have any case of justified envy. I find that limited consideration
8The model of beliefs closely follows that of Kapor et al. (2020) and is related to Ajayi and Sidibé (2017) and
Luflade (2018).
9I say that a student has justified envy for a school if the student and the school are not matched to each other, but
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results in significant amounts of justified envy. Students view approximately nine schools with jus-
tified envy on average. Black and Hispanic students tend to have more cases of justified envy than
Asian and White students. The estimated model also enables me to simulate students’ subjectively
optimal reports and estimate what fraction of the reports are truthfully ordered in terms of their
preferences. Similarly, by comparing the subjectively optimal reports to the reports that are objec-
tively optimal in terms of the equilibrium admission probabilities, the optimality of the reports can
be evaluated.
I also quantify racial integration and equity in welfare. The differences in outcomes under
school choice matching relative to counterfactual neighborhood school matching represent the
impact of school choice. I then decompose the contributions of different factors—residential lo-
cations, student preferences, schools’ priorities and rankings over the students, and optimization
frictions. The results show that school choice slightly promotes racial integration relative to the
neighborhood matching. For students of each race, the average proportion of the own-race stu-
dents in the students’ assigned schools decreases by approximately 0 to 10 percentage points.
School choice also significantly improves welfare across all races; while only about 6% of the stu-
dents would be matched to one of their top five preferred schools under the neighborhood match-
ing, the proportion increases to approximately 35% under the school choice matching. However,
these gains are compromised by deviations from fully informed behavior. If students considered all
schools, students would be about twice as likely to be matched to their top five preferred schools.
Schools’ admission priorities and screening policies tend to segregate races and primarily benefit
Asian and White students.
Related Literature The dissertation complements the literature that empirically examines the
contributions of different factors to equity or segregation under centralized school choice proce-
dures (Oosterbeek et al., 2019; Laverde, 2020; Sartain and Barrow, 2020). My paper disentangles
the impacts of lack of information from preferences, given abundant evidence of informational
both would prefer to be matched to one another than to (one of) the current assignments. This definition is consistent
with the usage of the term in the literature.
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frictions in NYC. Relatedly, Kessel and Olme (2018) focus on the impact of school priorities on
segregation and Calsamiglia et al. (2020b) theoretically examine the impact of matching algo-
rithms on segregation. Akbarpour et al. (2020) show that strategy-proof algorithms can neutralize
the impacts of unequal outside options. There have been studies that examine the distributional
impacts of school choice in other contexts (e.g., Epple and Romano, 1998; Hsieh and Urquiola,
2006; Bifulco and Ladd, 2007; Neilson, 2013; Altonji et al., 2015; Avery and Pathak, 2015; Hom,
2018).
My paper provides sufficient conditions for nonparametric identification of latent consideration
and latent beliefs about admission chances, in addition to latent preferences, using data on observed
choices. These results build on a broad literature that deals with some but not all of the issues dis-
cussed in my paper. Agarwal and Somaini (2018) provide sufficient conditions for nonparametric
identification of preferences while assuming full consideration and holding fixed a mode of be-
liefs. Kapor et al. (2020) estimate a model that allows for latent beliefs about admission chances
in addition to latent preferences, using survey data on perceived admission chances and data on
rank-ordered lists. My model of beliefs largely follows theirs, and my paper complements their
work by providing results on identification that use data on observed choices rather than survey
data. Relatedly, Luflade (2018), Calsamiglia et al. (2020a), and Ajayi and Sidibé (2017) estimate
preferences and beliefs with the observed choice data without surveys. Some papers propose strate-
gies for estimating preferences while allowing for mistaken beliefs under the Boston mechanism
(He, 2017; Hwang, 2017) and while allowing for nontruthful behavior under the DA mechanism
(Artemov et al., 2017; Fack et al., 2019).10 My paper complements the literature by also allowing
for limited consideration and by providing conditions that ensure nonparametric identification.11
My paper quantifies the influences of different factors on student welfare and matching stability.
10There are also studies that only assume “weak” versions of the truthtelling assumption (e.g., Abdulkadiroğlu et al.,
2017; Che and Tercieux, 2019).
11Outside the literature on school choice, my paper relates to a strand of the discrete choice literature that discusses
the identification of preferences and consideration sets (e.g., Goeree, 2008; Conlon and Mortimer, 2013; Gaynor et al.,
2016; Hortaçsu et al., 2017; Abaluck and Adams, 2017) and of preferences and beliefs (e.g., Aguirregabiria (2020)).
The approaches used in nonparametric identification results are further related to, for example, Thompson (1989),
Bresnahan and Reiss (1991), Lewbel (2000), Berry et al. (2013), and Berry and Haile (2020).
6
Relatedly, Abdulkadiroğlu et al. (2017) compares student welfare under coordinated and uncoordi-
nated assignment procedures in the NYC high school choice system. Luflade (2018) analyzes the
value of information about admission chances on welfare. Other studies compare student welfare
or matching stability under different school assignment procedures (e.g., Narita, 2016; Abdulka-
diroglu et al., 2017; He, 2017; Hwang, 2017; Agarwal and Somaini, 2018; Luflade, 2018; Che and
Tercieux, 2019; Kapor et al., 2020; Calsamiglia et al., 2020a). My paper attempts to prevent the
influences of frictions in both consideration and the assessment of admission chances from being
attributed to utilities.
I also contribute to the growing literature that documents frictions in centralized school choice.
I first document evidence of nontruthful reporting even when such a strategy is weakly dominated,
which is consistent with the findings in Artemov et al. (2017) and Fack et al. (2019). Such evi-
dence complements the theoretical findings that the strategy-proofness of DA may be difficult for
the boundedly rational agents to understand (Li, 2017; Ashlagi and Gonczarowski, 2018) and the
related findings from surveys and experiments (Chen and Sönmez, 2006; Calsamiglia et al., 2010;
Hassidim et al., 2017). I further document evidence that students may not be aware of all the avail-
able school options. Corcoran et al. (2018) provide evidence that information intervention affects
application behavior in the NYC high school application procedure; others reach similar conclu-
sions in other environments of school or college applications (e.g., Hastings and Weinstein, 2008;
Hoxby and Turner, 2013; Ajayi et al., 2017).
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Chapter 1
Evidence of Frictions and Disparities in New
York City’s High School Choice Procedure
1.1 Introduction
This chapter provides an overview of the public high school choice procedure in NYC. It presents
evidence that applicants are not aware of all the schools in NYC and that they may be misunder-
standing the properties of the Deferred Acceptance algorithm. It also documents some patterns
of racial disparities and the usage of choice. Such evidence motivates the model of application
considered in Chapter 2 and the analysis performed in Chapter 3.
1.2 Overview of New York City’s High School Choice Proce-
dure
This section gives an overview of the public high school choice in NYC. Section 1.2.1 provides
the context of NYC’s public high school choice. Section 1.2.2 explains the theoretical properties
of the DA mechanism implemented in NYC and potential failures in practice.
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1.2.1 The Context
The NYC public high school choice system matches approximately 80,000 students to more than
700 public high school programs each year. The system uses the following centralized procedure:
(1) Each applicant submits her rankings over the school programs. She can rank up to 12 school
programs.
(2) Each school program ranks applicants according to the admission policies. The rankings
can depend on the admission priority groups assigned to the students, screening based on
students’ past performances and other factors, and lotteries.
(3) NYC runs a student-proposing DA algorithm to assign students to school programs using
the rankings of the students and the school programs.
See Appendix 1.4.2 for algorithmic rules of the DA and the details of implementation. The match-
ing procedure in NYC creates incentives for the applicants to deviate from truthfully reporting their
preferences, despite the well-known property of DA to be strategy-proof for the proposing side in
its ideal implementation. This is discussed in Section 1.2.2.
Characteristics of the student sample are summarized in Table 1.1.1 The district has many
minority students and low-income students. Of the students in the sample, 40.7% of the students
are Hispanic, 27.1% are Black, 16.2% are Asian, and 14.5% are White.2 71% of the students are
eligible for free or reduced-price lunch.
The school characteristics are summarized in Table 1.2 by borough. Schools vary widely in
their characteristics, within and across boroughs. For example, while on average Hispanic students
comprise 65% of the student body in a school in the Bronx, they comprise only 28% in Staten
Island. There is also wide within-borough variability; for instance, the standard deviation of the
1For discussions of the data and the sample, refer to Section 1.3.1.
2For a more detailed explanation of race and ethnicity, refer to the NYC DOE’s survey on ethnicity and race
identification: https://www.schools.nyc.gov/docs/default-source/default-document-library/pseform-english. I use race
and ethnicity interchangeably in this paper.
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Table 1.1: Characteristics of Students by Ethnicity
Asian Black Hispanic White Totala
Proportion in the sample 16.2% 27.1% 40.7% 14.5% 98.5%
Female 49.7% 50.1% 49.1% 50.2% 49.6%
English Language Learner 8.6% 1.5% 13.5% 4.0% 7.9%
Subsidized lunch 68.3% 76.5% 81.2% 37.1% 70.9%
Neighborhood incomeb($) 58853.2 49797.2 47332.5 73893.4 54071.8
Home boroughs
Bronx 5.4% 24.5% 36.2% 5.9% 23.1%
Brooklyn 28.5% 43.3% 20.1% 34.2% 30.0%
Manhattan 8.1% 8.5% 12.2% 13.5% 10.7%
Queens 53.8% 20.6% 26.9% 25.4% 29.6%
Staten Island 4.2% 3.2% 4.6% 21.0% 6.7%
Home language
English 28.3% 91.6% 40.7% 69.0% 56.7%
Spanish 0.5% 0.6% 59.1% 1.0% 24.3%
Any Chinese 38.1% 0.1% 0.0% 0.3% 6.6%
Other 33.2% 7.7% 0.1% 29.7% 12.4%
State Reading Category
High 46.3% 17.6% 17.2% 49.0% 27.2%
Middle 46.4% 66.7% 65.2% 46.0% 59.4%
Low 7.2% 15.7% 17.7% 4.9% 13.4%
Notes: Except for the proportion in the sample, all the percentage terms repre-
sent the proportions of the relevant categories within each ethnicity.
a 1.5% of students are multi-racial or Native American.
b based on the ZIP code of student’s home address. Median household income
from U.S. Census Bureau, 2013-2017 American Community Survey five-year
estimates, in 2017 dollars.
proportion of Hispanic students is as large as 22% within Brooklyn. The schools tend to be small;
the average capacity of a 9th-grade class is around 150. While there are only nine schools in Staten
Island, there are roughly around 100 schools in each of the other four boroughs.
1.2.2 Deferred Acceptance Algorithm: Theory and Practice
The DA algorithm has been gaining wider popularity3 based partly on theoretical results that
promise certain desirable properties. One such property is that the mechanism is strategy-proof
for the applicants: truthfully reporting their preference rankings weakly dominates any other strat-
3DA is used in, for example, Boston, Chicago, Finland, Ghana, and Taiwan (Fack et al., 2019).
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Table 1.2: Characteristics of Schools by Borough
Bronx Brooklyn Manhattan Queens Staten Island Total
Graduation rate 0.69 0.74 0.79 0.79 0.78 0.75
(0.14) (0.14) (0.16) (0.16) (0.10) (0.15)
College/career rate 0.49 0.52 0.61 0.64 0.65 0.56
(0.15) (0.17) (0.19) (0.19) (0.15) (0.18)
Average grade 8 math (std.) -0.50 -0.19 0.34 0.48 0.53 0.00
(0.58) (0.82) (1.17) (1.11) (0.64) (1.00)
Value-added (std.) -0.10 0.02 0.05 0.10 -0.53 0.00
(1.12) (0.96) (0.92) (1.01) (0.68) (1.00)
Proportion White 0.03 0.08 0.10 0.11 0.43 0.08
(0.04) (0.12) (0.15) (0.11) (0.21) (0.13)
Proportion Black 0.28 0.54 0.26 0.28 0.17 0.34
(0.12) (0.28) (0.15) (0.26) (0.12) (0.24)
Proportion Asian 0.03 0.07 0.09 0.22 0.08 0.10
(0.03) (0.10) (0.12) (0.15) (0.03) (0.12)
Proportion Hispanic 0.65 0.30 0.52 0.35 0.28 0.45
(0.13) (0.22) (0.21) (0.21) (0.12) (0.24)
9th grade capacity 116.82 159.89 137.38 185.73 316.67 151.17
(78.57) (141.34) (84.23) (138.49) (206.80) (120.31)
Number of schools 111 113 101 79 9 413
Notes: The standard deviations in each respective borough or in NYC are given in parentheses.
Standardized values are indicated by (std.). College/career rate indicates the proportion of students
who graduated from high school four years after entering 9th grade and then enrolled in college, a
vocational program, or a public service program within six months of graduation. Value-added is the
measure of the school value-added by a school, which is provided by the NYC DOE and is based
on the school’s performance relative to a comparison group of similar students. All schools have
equal weight regardless of their class sizes. The sample excludes the nine specialized high schools
and schools with missing data.
egy. Another such property is matching stability. An important feature of matching stability is that
the matching does not have any unmatched student-school pair such that each side prefers the other
to (one of) the current assignment(s), i.e., the matching does not have any cases of justified envy.4
However, these properties do not directly address distributional outcomes such as racial integration
or the equity of assignments.
Even the two desirable outcomes promised by the theoretical results, namely, stability and
4Closely following the definition in Roth and Sotomayor (1992), a matching is stable if there does not exist: (1) any
case of a blocking pair, i.e., an unmatched student-school pair where each side prefers the other to [one of] the current
assignment[s] (which might be an empty seat or no school assignment), and (2) any case of individual irrationality,
where a student [school] would prefer to remain unmatched [have one additional empty seat] than to be matched to
[one of] the current assignment[s]. It follows that a student has justified envy if he is part of some blocking pair.
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truthtelling, may fail in practice. Survey- and experiment-based evidence shows that a fraction of
applicants do not truthfully report even in DA mechanisms.5 Complementing these results, theoret-
ical studies have revealed that although Deferred Acceptance is strategy-proof, it is not “obviously
strategy-proof” (Li, 2017) in generic cases in the sense that applicants with limited rationality may
not understand its strategy-proofness (Ashlagi and Gonczarowski, 2018). The failure of strategy-
proofness may undermine stability.6 Stability can also fail when students consider only a limited
set of schools. Furthermore, theoretically ideal versions of DA that guarantee strategy-proofness
and stability are only occasionally implemented in practice.7
The matching procedure in NYC creates incentives for the applicants to deviate from truthfully
reporting their preferences. This is because NYC’s implementation of DA deviates from its canon-
ical implementation in two respects. First, while the canonical implementation allows applicants to
list arbitrarily many school programs, in NYC, applicants can list only up to 12 school programs.
Students who wish to apply to more than 12 school programs must then decide which of these
programs will be listed, which optimally depends not only on their preferences but also on their
admission chances to the schools. Reflecting this, the 2017 NYC High School Directory states that
“If you are applying to ‘reach’ programs, be sure to include ‘target’ or ‘likely-match’ programs on
your application.” Second, while the canonical implementation conceives a single round of appli-
cations, in NYC, there is an after-market that follows the main round.8 If a student believes that
she can be matched to a school in this after-market, she may choose not to apply to this school in
the main round.
In addition, given that there are more than 700 school programs in NYC, it is unlikely that
the students are aware of every one of them. Corcoran et al. (2018) has found that providing
5See, e.g., Chen and Sönmez (2006), Calsamiglia et al. (2010), and Hassidim et al. (2017).
6See, e.g., Gale and Shapley (1962). When agents make only payoff-irrelevant deviations from truthful reporting,
then the resulting matching can still be stable (Artemov et al., 2017; Fack et al., 2019).
7See, e.g., Abdulkadiroğlu et al. (2009), Haeringer and Klijn (2009), and Calsamiglia et al. (2010).
8Until 2019, there was a second-round of DA for the schools with remaining seats (see, e.g., Narita (2016)). In
2020, the NYC DOE began to use waitlists, replacing the second-round DA.
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information about high-performing schools in the local neighborhood altered the students’ choices
in NYC. Additionally, lower-income families may have differentially less information about high-
performing schools due to differences in social networks or other reasons (Sattin-Bajaj, 2016).
In the next section, I document evidence of nontruthful behavior and frictions in information
and in the assessment of admission chances.
1.3 Evidence of Frictions, Disparities, and Usage of Choice
This section presents some motivating descriptive evidence for the main analysis. Section 1.3.1
introduces the data used. Evidence in section 1.3.2 suggests a substantial lack of awareness of
the schools. The evidence also suggests that students take admission chances into account when
applying for the schools and misunderstand the properties of the matching algorithm. Section 1.3.3
documents the patterns of racial disparities and usage of school choice.
1.3.1 Data
The main source of data is the administrative data provided by the NYC DOE for the 2016–2017
academic year. The data include students’ choices of rank-ordered lists, final school assignments,
admission priorities at the school programs, and demographic information. The demographic infor-
mation includes students’ gender, race, English Language Learner status, language spoken at home,
home address, subsidized lunch status, disability status, and performance on statewide seventh-
grade English and math tests. As some demographic data are missing for the students who did not
attend an NYC DOE public school at the time of application, I restrict the sample to be the eighth
graders who were attending an NYC DOE public school at the time of application.9 This sample
includes the students who opted out of the school choice process, who constitute approximately
5% of the sample. I also use publicly available school-level data provided by the NYC DOE.
9There are some ninth graders who participate in the process, but they constitute less than 5% of the total applicants,
and they can apply to only a subset of the schools. For computational feasibility, for certain results, a random subsample
of 10,000 or 20,000 students was used.
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1.3.2 Evidence of Frictions
Evidence shows that students face substantial frictions in learning about the school options and
in making strategic decisions while going through the NYC high school application procedure.
Table 1.3 suggests that students tend not to be aware of the schools listed later in the high school
directory, which is their primary reference for the application process. It also suggests that students
take admission chances into account in their portfolio decisions even when the list length constraint
does not bind; in such a case, it is suboptimal to drop a school that the student prefers to the outside
option unless the student has zero chance of admission. Each column in the table represents the
estimates of a linear probability model that predicts whether a student has applied to a school. An
observation is a student-school pair. The students who exhausted all the 12 slots were dropped.
The columns labeled as All indicates that all such student-school pairs were used. Surely Aware
uses only the student-school pairs for which the student is assumed to be aware of the school;
these are the schools within a half mile from the student’s home or within a quarter mile from the
student’s middle school. Likely uses only the student-school pairs for which the student is assumed
to believe that he has a positive chance of assignment to the school upon application; these schools
are those that did not fill their seats in the prior year and those such that the student is in the first
priority group and the school accepted every such student in the prior year. Surely Considered uses
the intersection of Surely Aware and Likely. The controls are the interactions of student ethnicity
and other student characteristics (subsidized lunch status and indicators of borough) and school-
level variables (including indicators of borough, average input math proficiency, attendance rates,
and schools’ ethnic composition) and student-school specific variables (polynomial in distance,
indicators for the high school equaling the student’s middle school, and indicators for school’s
borough being the same as the student’s home borough).
Page rank denotes the within-borough rank of the schools in terms of the order in which they are
listed in NYC’s High School Directory, which is more than 600 pages long.10 For example, a school
10According to Sattin-Bajaj et al. (2018), guidance counselors say that the printed directory is the main source of

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































with a page rank of five is the fifth school to be listed within its borough. In Table 1.3, I scaled this
variable by 100 so that the fifth school has a value of 0.05. The schools are ordered alphabetically
within each borough; therefore, it may be argued that page rank can only affect awareness and
not preferences or admission chances. Table 1.5 shows that page rank is largely uncorrelated with
observable school characteristics. Priority rank denotes the rank of the admission priority group of
the student for the school. Students in the first priority group are given the priority rank of one.11
The patterns of correlation between page ranks and applications in Table 1.3 show evidence for
the joint hypothesis that (i) the page rank affects the application decision through the awareness
channel, and (ii) applicants are indeed aware of the schools in the assumed Surely Aware sets. To
see this, suppose that (ii) holds. Then, as the observations in (1), (2), (5), and (6) are the subsets
of student-school pairs such that the school is in the Surely Aware set of the student, page rank
cannot affect application through awareness in these columns. Thus, the near-zero association of
page rank with the application rates in these columns suggests that page rank does not affect the
application decision through any channel other than awareness. In contrast, an increase in page
rank is associated with significant drops in application probabilities in columns (3), (4), (7), and
(8), showing evidence that page rank does significantly affect application rates through awareness.
On the other hand, if it is taken as given that page rank affects applications strictly through the
awareness channel, these results are consistent with the hypothesis that the applicants are indeed
aware of the schools in the assumed Surely Aware sets.
The patterns of correlation between priority ranks and applications show evidence for the joint
hypothesis that (i) the applicants take their admission priorities into account in their portfolio
choice decisions (even when the list length constraint does not bind) exactly through the assessment
of admission chances, and that (ii) applicants believe that they have positive admission chances for
the Likely schools upon application. To see this, assume that (ii) holds. Note that the observations
in columns (5) and (7) are the subsets of student-school pairs such that the school is in the Likely
11If there are multiple school programs in a school, I selected the program that gives the student the most favorable
priority rank.
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Table 1.4: Regression of Submitted Rank on Priority Rank
Dependent variable: Rank in submitted report
Listed 2 Listed 4 Listed 6 Listed 8 Listed 10 Listed 12
Priority rank 0.106∗∗ 0.153∗∗∗ 0.130∗∗∗ 0.108∗∗ 0.184∗∗∗ 0.241∗∗∗
(0.047) (0.045) (0.040) (0.045) (0.058) (0.033)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 830 3,148 6,890 8,748 7,581 30,608
F Statistic 73.019∗∗∗ 154.843∗∗∗ 284.708∗∗∗ 345.411∗∗∗ 284.858∗∗∗ 1,124.645∗∗∗
Notes: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01. An observation is an applicant-school pair. Listed k selects
applicants who listed k schools. Priority rank denotes the rank of the admission priority group of
the student for the school. Students of the first priority group are given the priority rank of 1.
set of the student; therefore, for these columns, priority cannot affect applications by affecting
the assessment of whether the applicants have any chance of admission. Thus, the near-zero as-
sociation of priorities with application rates in these columns suggests that priorities do not affect
the application decision through any channel other than admission probabilities. In contrast, lower
priorities (higher priority ranks) are associated with drops in application probabilities in columns
(6) and (8), showing evidence that priorities affect application rates by affecting the applicants’
beliefs about admission probabilities. On the other hand, if it is taken as given that priorities affect
applications strictly through admission probabilities conditional on observables, these results can
alternatively be interpreted as justifying the hypothesis that the applicants do believe that they have
positive admission chances for the assumed Likely schools upon application.
Table 1.4 suggests that applicants take priorities into account in ranking the listed schools.
Each column represents a linear regression of the submitted rank of a school on priority rank and
controls using a sample of applicants who listed a given number of schools. The controls are the
same as in Table 1.3 except that now page rank also constitute the controls. We see that priority
group significantly predicts the rank at which a school is listed; an increase in the priority rank by
one is associated with a 0.11 increase in the submitted rank for the students who list two schools
and a 0.24 increase for the students who exhaust the list by filling in all the 12 slots. However, in
a DA mechanism, the submitted rankings among the listed schools should optimally reflect only
the preferences, not the admission chances. Therefore, to the extent that priorities are uncorrelated
17
Figure 1.1: Nearby and Applied Schools, by Ethnicity
Notes: College/career rate denotes the school’s proportion of students who enrolled in college, a vocational pro-
gram, or a public service program within six months of graduation. Student’s middle school math score is the
applicant’s performance in middle school in the New York State Math test. The lines represent smoothed condi-
tional means. The shaded regions represent 95% confidence intervals. The dashed lines indicate the schools within
one mile from the applicant’s home address. The solid lines represent the schools that the applicant has listed on
the submitted rank-order report.
with the unobserved preferences conditional on the controls, the pattern in the table suggests that
applicants make mistakes in strategizing due to misunderstandings about the properties of the DA
mechanism.
1.3.3 Patterns of Disparities and Choice
Figure 1.1 document some patterns of racial disparities and usage of choice. College/career rate
denotes the school’s proportion of students who graduated from high school four years after they
entered 9th grade and then enrolled in college, a vocational program, or a public service program
within six months of graduation. Student’s middle school math score is the applicant’s perfor-
mance in the New York State Mathematics test in middle school. The figure shows substantial
racial disparities in the schools that applicants live close to (within one mile from home). These
18
disparities do not converge even after controlling for applicants’ performance in the mathematics
tests. However, the patterns suggest that applicants use school choice to apply to higher-performing
schools. Additionally, in terms of the schools that applicants apply to, the racial disparities are
reduced, especially for high-performing applicants. Furthermore, high-performing applicants are
more likely to apply more aggressively to high-performing schools. The pattern could be explained
by differences in preferences, in awareness, or in assessments about admission chances. Figure 1.2
document patterns of racial disparities in other school characteristics in terms of the schools that
students live close to, apply to, and are assigned to.
19
1.4 Appendix
1.4.1 Additional Tables and Figures
1.4.2 Deferred Acceptance Mechanism in NYC
In the 2016–2017 school year, the DOE ran two rounds of DA assignments for the traditional
(non-specialized) high schools and one round of such DA assignments for the nine specialized
high schools. In my main analysis, I focus on the first round for the non-specialized high schools;
approximately 70% of all the high school students in NYC attend one of these schools. This is the
“main” round, in the sense that approximately 90% of the final matches are formed in this round.
Using the students’ submitted rankings over the school programs and the programs’ rank-
ings over the students, the DA algorithm (Gale and Shapley (1962); Abdulkadiroğlu and Sönmez
(2003)) matches the students to the school programs according to the following procedure.
• Step 1: Each applicant proposes to his first-ranked school program, if any. Each school pro-
gram sorts the proposers according to its rankings and tentatively accepts all the highest-
ranking proposers up to its capacity. It rejects any other proposers.
Then for each k ≥ 2,
• Step k: Each applicant who was not tentatively accepted by any program in Step (k − 1)
proposes to his highest-ranked school program that has not previously rejected him, if any.
Each school program sorts the new proposers and the applicants tentatively accepted previ-
ously according to its rankings and tentatively accepts all the highest-ranking applicants up
to its capacity. All the other proposers are rejected.
The algorithm stops when there is no proposing student. Each student is assigned his final tentative
assignment. In NYC high school match, the school programs have separate seats (capacities) for
students with and without disabilities. Therefore, DA algorithms are run separately for the two
student groups defined by their disabilities type.
20













Percent of students who feel safe 16.884
(29.427)










F Statistic 1.456 (df = 9; 342)
Notes: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01. Standard errors in parenthe-
ses. Standardized values are indicated by (std.). College/career rate
indicates the proportion of students who graduated from high school
four years after they entered 9th grade and then enrolled in college,
a vocational program, or a public service program within six months
of graduation. Each school has equal weight regardless of class size.
The sample excludes the nine specialized high schools and schools
with missing data.
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Figure 1.2: Schools Nearby, Applied to, and Matched, by Ethnicity
Notes: Nearby schools are the schools within one mile from student’s home. The applied and assigned schools are
from the main round of applications. pct stu safe denotes the proportion of students who have reported that they
feel safe in the school. College career rate indicates the proportion of students who graduated from high school
four years after they entered 9th grade and then enrolled in college, a vocational program, or a public service






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Model of Applications and Nonparametric
Identification Using Rank-ordered Data
2.1 Introduction
This chapter develops a model of student’s application behavior and considers the identification
of the model. Building on the evidence from Chapter 1, the model allows that the students’ ap-
plication behavior to be affected by (limited) consideration sets and the subjective beliefs about
admission chances in addition to the preferences about the schools. Although the model posits the
centralized school choice environment in New York City, the model and the identification strat-
egy are also relevant for a broader class of centralized matching procedures. The chapter provides
both intuitive arguments for identification and formal results on nonparametric identifiability. The
empirical model in Chapter 3 uses a parametric version of the model considered in this chapter.
2.2 Model of Students’ Application Behavior
In this section, I lay out the model of school applications. Students are modeled as expected utility
maximizers who are subject to two types of optimization frictions. First, they may consider only a
limited set of school options. Second, they may have incorrect beliefs about the equilibrium assign-
ment probabilities. In particular, these incorrect beliefs may reflect students’ misunderstandings of
24
the properties of the DA mechanism.1
A school is defined to be considered by an applicant if (1) he is aware of that school, and (2) he
believes he has a positive chance of assignment to that school upon listing it.2 The consideration set
of applicant i, which is the set of schools considered by applicant i, is denoted by Ci. Consideration
of school j by applicant i is determined by a latent variable cij ∈ (−∞,∞].3 A school is considered
if and only if cij > 0.






where r denotes the report, j ∈ {1, · · · , J} ≡ J denotes a school that is matched through the
application procedure, j = 0 denotes the outside option,4 prij ∈ [0, 1] denotes i’s subjective belief
about the probability of being assigned to j upon submitting report r, and vij is the utility that i
derives from being assigned to j. An agent with a consideration set Ci chooses a report fromR(Ci),
which denotes the set of all the ordered lists of schools in Ci with length at most 12, including an
empty list denoted by r = ∅.5 The empty list represents nonparticipation in the first round of the
application process. Although r is an ordered list, I occasionally abuse notations and treat r as if it
1While truthtelling behavior is subsumed in the model as a special case, it is not assumed a priori.
2This definition differs from the typical definition of consideration in the discrete choice literature in that I also
impose (2) in addition to (1). However, the imposition of (2) is natural in this setting where assignment is stochastic
at the time of reporting. Furthermore, (the lack of) consideration may be interpreted to additionally capture some
factors other than awareness and degenerate admission chances: fear of rejection, risk aversion, or the psychological
cost of writing. In other words, the model of consideration intends to capture any reason other than preferences that
might prevent a student from listing a school. I stress awareness and degenerate assignment probabilities, as evidence
suggests these channels are significant.
3In Section 2.3, I will assume that there are certain schools that are surely considered by an applicant; such a school
is denoted by cij =∞ for notational convenience.
4The outside option is interpreted as the inclusive value of remaining unassigned in the main round of the applica-
tion process.




(j1, . . . , jk) ∈ Cki | jl1 6= jl2 for all (l1, l2) ∈ {1, · · · , k}2 with l1 6= l2
}
. Note
also that the students actually rank school programs rather than schools. However, for most of the observed charac-
teristics, I do not observe them separately by programs—they are aggregated at the school level. Therefore, I simplify
the analysis by modeling students as applying to schools as a whole rather than to programs.
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were an unordered set. The solution to the maximization problem is denoted by ri.
I model beliefs about assignment probabilities following Kapor et al. (2020), which is moti-
vated by the cutoff and score representation of the matching algorithms (Agarwal and Somaini,
2018; Azevedo and Leshno, 2016). Under this representation, each student is assigned a scoreij
for each school, which is determined as a function of the admission priority groups, admission lot-
teries, or the rank of the student based on schools’ screening policies. One important aspect of DA
is that the scoreij can never be a function of the student’s submitted ranking of the school. Each
school has a student-type-specific cutoff, i.e., cutoffj(type) =: cutoffij . In NYC, the type indi-
cates whether the student has disabilities.6 The representation states that each student is matched
to her first school in the list for which her scoreij falls below cutoffij . That is,
i is matched to j
⇔
j is the earliest-ranked school in ri for which cutoffij − scoreij > 0.
I model beliefs about the assignment probabilities using this representation. Each student forms
subjective assessments of his cutoffij − scoreij for each school j. For student i, his assessment
of cutoffij − scoreij =: diffij is represented by the student-specific random variable d̃iffij(k) :=
c̃utoffij − s̃coreij(k), where k denotes the rank of j in the report; the randomness represents
the student’s perceived uncertainty about the scores and the cutoffs. Note that the distribution of
s̃coreij(k) can depend on the rank k; although the rank cannot affect the scores in DA, I allow that
students may not understand this property.7 However, I do assume that applicants are monotone in
their misunderstanding; they understand that ranking a school later can never improve their scores.
Formally, I assume k < k′ implies s̃coreij(k) ≤ s̃coreij(k′) for all (i, j) in any realization.
6For school programs that have the educational option admission method, the type also depends on the applicant’s
reading category as determined by the English Language Arts (ELA) score in the middle school.
7If students correctly understood that the rank cannot affect the scores, they would always truthfully rank the
schools among the ones that are listed. On the other hand, even in such a case, it is still possible that there exists some
unlisted school that is considered and preferred to a listed school if the list length constraint binds.
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Using the scores-and-cutoffs representation, I model subjective beliefs as follows: if j is listed
in report r, then
prij
= Pi(d̃iffij′(krj′) < 0 for all j
′ listed before j)Pi(d̃iffij(krj ) > 0) (2.2.2)
= Πk−1l=1 (1− qijrl l)qijk
where krj denotes the rank of j in report r, qijk denotes Pi(d̃iffij(k) > 0), and jrl denotes the school
listed at the lth spot in r. If j is not listed in report r, then prij = 0.
The next section addresses the identification of the model.
2.3 Identifying Preferences, Consideration, and Beliefs
This section lays out an intuitive overview of the identification strategy, where I demonstrate how
three channels—preferences, consideration, and beliefs—can be separated out. These ideas are
formalized in Section 2.4, where I develop sufficient conditions for nonparametric identification.
I first demonstrate that there is variation in the data that is affected only by preferences and
consideration, and not by beliefs. Observation 1 shows that beliefs do not affect (1) the number of
schools in an applicant’s list or (2) whether a school is written on an applicant’s list, given that the
applicant’s list contains strictly fewer than 12 schools.
Observation 1 (Variation reflecting only preferences and consideration). Suppose applicant i’s
list ri has strictly fewer than 12 schools. Then, j ∈ ri if and only if both cij > 0 and vij > 0.
Furthermore, ri has strictly fewer than 12 schools if and only if {j ∈ J |vij > 0, cij > 0} has
strictly fewer than 12 schools.
The proof is given in Appendix 2.5.3. Given that Observation 1 shows that there is data varia-
tion that is strictly affected by preferences and consideration, a natural question is whether there is
also variation that can be used to disentangle preferences from consideration.
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It is intuitive that such separation may be possible if (1) there were some schools that are
“surely” considered by an applicant or if (2) there were shifters of consideration that were excluded
from utilities. I define the surely considered set of applicant i as the set of schools that are surely
considered by applicant i. It is denoted by Si, and Si ⊆ Ci with probability 1. The following
observation, which follows as a corollary of Observation 1, is helpful in separating preferences
and consideration using the surely considered sets.
Observation 2 (Variation almost only reflecting preferences). Suppose applicant i’s list ri has
strictly fewer than 12 schools and that j ∈ Si. Then, j ∈ ri if and only if vij > 0.
That is, if one focuses on the student-school pairs for which (1) the student does not exhaust
all the slots in the report and (2) the student surely considers the school, then whether the school is
on his list is solely determined by the preferences.
However, there is a problem in interpreting Observation 2 as a statement precisely about pref-
erences; students who do not exhaust all the slots are not randomly selected. Rather, the selection
is determined by both preferences and consideration, as discussed in Observation 1. Nonetheless,
the selection problem is mild. First, if (vi1, · · · , viJ) are independent across j conditional on ob-
servables,8 the selection problem vanishes through a more “careful” selection of the student-school
pairs.9 Second, while Observation 2 uses only the surely considered sets to disentangle preferences
from consideration, we may also have some consideration shifters that are excluded from prefer-
ences. The conditions in Propositions 1 and 4 represent an idealized analogue of this situation,10
and under such conditions the selection issue again vanishes. Third, if we were interested in the
joint distribution of the utilities among only the surely considered schools, the selection problem
almost vanishes in the sense that any point of the joint distribution function of the utilities can be
8This is the case in the current version of empirical specification. Such a specification rules out, for example, the
usage of a random coefficient model. However, given a wide set of observed student-level variables, such a specifi-
cation may not be very restrictive. Pathak and Shi (2020) finds little gains in performance by allowing for random
coefficients, given the allowed heterogeneity in coefficients along the observed students’ characteristics.
9This is done by selecting (i, j) pairs such that |ri\{j}| < 11 where |ri\{j}| denotes the number of schools in
report ri after excluding j from the report if it was listed. For more discussion, see Section 3.3.1.
10Proposition 4 further assumes the presence of an observable utility shifter that are excluded from consideration.
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bounded by an interval with a length of approximately .03 in expectation (see case (ii) of Proposi-
tion 5).
Taken together, Observations 1 and 2 provide the basis for the separate identification of pref-
erences and consideration. That is, intuitively, it may be possible to first identify preferences using
Observation 2 and then identify consideration using Observation 1. Propositions 1 and 2 in Sec-
tion 2.4 formalize the intuition by providing sufficient conditions under which the distributions of
preferences and consideration sets are nonparametrically identified.
To identify beliefs, we may use the remaining variation in the data. First, in Observations 1 and
2, we did not utilize the information in how the applicants ordered the schools; we used only the
information of whether schools were listed. Second, we have not yet utilized the variation in the
portfolio choices of applicants who had more than 12 considered schools that they preferred to the
outside option. These aspects of data variation are affected by beliefs in addition to preferences
and consideration.
Observation 3 (Variation reflecting beliefs).
(i) Suppose that the applicant has more than 12 schools that are acceptable and con-





j∈J . In particular, the function is not constant in (p
r
ij)j∈J ,r∈R(J ).









In a restricted setting, Proposition 3 shows the conditions under which beliefs are nonparamet-
rically identified.
11From the construction of the maximization problem in Equation 2.2.1, report ri and the identities in the report is
a function of (prij)j∈J ,r∈R(J ). To see examples of nonconstancies of the functions with respect to (p
r
ij)j∈J ,r∈R(J )
under a simplified setting, see the cases in Proposition 3 and the corresponding proof.
29
2.4 Nonparametric Identification
The main results on nonparametric identification are provided here, and Appendix 2.5.1 provides
additional results under stronger and weaker sets of assumptions.
I assume the following for every proposition. First, I assume that beliefs are generated by stu-
dents making anticipations about differences in their scores and cutoffs, in the sense that Equa-
tion 2.2.2 holds. Second, I assume that perceived scores are increasing in rank as in Section
2.2. Third, I assume that the distribution of vi|zi is continuous for every zi ∈ supp(zi) and that
qijk ≡ Pi(d̃iffij(k) > 0) ∈ (0, 1) for every considered schools. On the other hand, I do not assume
that the maximum allowed list length, denoted L, has to equal 12.
To discuss the results, I define two concepts: an extreme consideration shifter excluded from
preferences and a special regressor with large support (Thompson, 1989; Lewbel, 2000).
Definition 1. Let zi ≡ (ai, z−i ). A J−dimensional random vector ai is called an extreme con-
sideration shifter excluded from preferences if vi |= ai conditional on z−i and, for all z−i in its
support, there exist some known ā(z−i ) ∈ supp(ai|z−i ) such that P
(
cij > 0|aij = āj(z−i )
)
= 1.
In the empirical setting considered in Chapter 3, the role of an extreme consideration shifter
excluded from preferences is jointly played by surely considered sets12 and the excluded consid-
eration shifters, such as page rank and distance from middle school. However, they each play an
imperfect role; surely considered sets only move certain schools’ consideration probabilities for
each student, and the excluded consideration shifters do not move consideration probabilities to 1,
i.e., to the extreme.13
Definition 2. A random vector zyi is called a special regressor for yi with large support condi-
tional on xi if yi = ỹi − zyi with ỹi |= z
y




= RK for all xi in its
support, where K is the dimension of yi.
12The indicators for surely considered sets are determined as a function of only the observables; therefore, they are
excluded from preferences conditional on observables.
13To complement the result, Proposition 5 only assumes presence of surely considered sets.
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In the empirical setting in Chapter 3, the role of a special regressor is played jointly14 by any
exogenous (i, j)−level observables, including distance to school, and the interactions between
school characteristics and the student-level observables.15
I first establish the nonparametric identifiability of preference. Proposition 1 shows that the
joint distribution of utilities is nonparametrically identified with a large-support special regressor
for the utilities and an extreme consideration shifter.
Proposition 1 (Identification of preferences). Suppose that we observe the following:
(a) an extreme consideration shifter excluded from preferences, named ai, and
(b) a special regressor for vi, named zvi , with large support conditional on zi\(zvi , ai).
Then, the joint distribution of utilities conditional on observables, P
(
vi ≤ v
∣∣zi), is identified for
almost all (v, zi) ∈ supp(vi, zi).16
Intuitively, one can use the extreme consideration shifter to push the consideration probability
of every school to 1, in which case the probability of listing schools becomes a sole function of
the utilities. One can then use the special regressor to “trace out” the distribution of the utilities
(Agarwal and Somaini, 2018). This distribution of the utilities is not conditioned on the value of
the extreme consideration shifter, as it was assumed to be conditionally independent of the utilities.
Note further that no assumption was made about allowed list length.
In my empirical model in Chapter 3, the set of exogenous (i, j)−level observables that enter
utilities, such as distance to school from home and the interactions between school characteristics
and the student-level observables, play the role of the special regressor. Although they may not
have large support in practice, it is not essential; with a special regressor with limited support,
14Results in Berry and Haile (2020) may be used to formally show how different variables can form an index that
mimics the role of a special regressor.
15Note that most results—except case (ii) of Proposition 4, which uses identification-at-infinity argument—can be
extended to allow for limited support on the special regressor at the cost of identifying the distribution of the utilities
or the latent variables for consideration on limited support.
16If the large support assumptions on the special regressors are weakened, then P
(
vi ≤ v
∣∣zi) is also identified on a
limited support.
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one can still obtain identification of the distribution of utilities on limited support. The role of an
extreme consideration shifter excluded from preferences is jointly played (imperfectly) by surely
considered sets and the excluded consideration shifters, such as page order and distance from
middle school.
Now I turn to the identification of consideration. Proposition 2 states that the distribution of
consideration indicators c∗ij := 1(cij > 0) can be nonparametrically identified with a special re-
gressor with large support, given that the distribution of utilities are already identified (potentially
through Proposition 1). It also assumes that the allowed list length L equals the number of schools
J , i.e., an applicant can list arbitrarily many schools. The joint distribution of consideration in-
dicators is point-identified if the utilities vi are independent of latent consideration variables ci
conditional on observables. It is partially identified if the conditional independence fails.
Proposition 2 (Identification of consideration). Suppose that P
(
vi ≤ v|zi = z
)
is identified for
almost all (v, z) ∈ supp(vi, zi). Suppose that we observe a special regressor for ci, named zci , with
large support conditional on zi\zci . Suppose also that L = J . Then,
(i) if ci is independent of vi conditional on zi, the joint distribution of consideration indi-
cators conditional on observables, P
(
c∗i ≤ c∗
∣∣zi), is identified for almost all (c∗, zi) ∈
supp(c∗i , zi).
17
(ii) if ci is not independent of vi conditional on zi, P
(
(c∗ij)j∈A ≤ c∗
∣∣(vij)j∈A > 0, zi) is identified




and for all A ⊆ J .






The intuition for part (i) is as follows. Given that an applicant can write an arbitrarily long list,
whether to list a school is a function of only utilities and consideration.19 However, knowing the
17If the large support assumptions on the special regressors are weakened, then P
(
c∗i ≤ c∗
∣∣zi) are also identified on
a limited support.
18On the other hand, it is never possible that ai = zci = z
v
i .
19Not allowing for truncated lists is a limitation of the result. Proposition 4 present a result with potentially truncated
lists with stronger data requirements.
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distribution of the utilities already, the probability of schools being listed is informative only about
consideration. The special regressor then traces out the distribution of ci, the latent consideration




In my empirical model in Chapter 3, the set of exogenous (i, j)−level observables that enter
consideration equation, such as distance to high school from students’ home or middle school
and the interactions between school characteristics and the student-level observables, play the role
of the special regressor. Again, the fact that they may not have large support in practice is not
essential; a special regressor with limited support still enables the identification of the distribution
of the latent consideration variable on limited support.
Now I turn to the identification of the beliefs about assignment probabilities. To present this
result, I first define equivalent classes of beliefs. Two beliefs are behaviorally equivalent if they lead
to the same reporting behavior conditional on any realization of the utilities and the consideration
sets:
Definition 3. Two beliefs {prj}j∈J ,r∈R(J ) and {p
′r
j }j∈J ,r∈R(J ) are behaviorally equivalent if for
all v ∈ RJ and Ci ⊆ J , arg maxr∈R(Ci) v · pr = arg maxr∈R(Ci) v · p
′r.
where (pr) = (prj)j∈J and similar for (p
′r). The notion of behavioral equivalence relates to the
notion of normalization.
Here I state the identification result on beliefs, which holds under a restricted setting.
Proposition 3 (Identification of beliefs). Suppose that P
(
vi ≤ v, c∗i ≤ c∗|zi = z
)
is identified for
every (v, c∗, z) ∈ supp(vi, c∗i , zi). Suppose that either (1) L = J = 2, or (2) L = 1. Suppose also
that beliefs are constant given observables, i.e. prij = p
r
j(zi) ∀(i, j, r). Then, beliefs {prj(zi)}j,r are
identified up to behaviorally equivalent classes.
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2.5 Appendix
2.5.1 Additional Propositions on Identification
Proposition 4 (Identification of preferences and consideration with ideal data). Suppose that we
observe zi ≡ (zvi , zci , z−i ) where (zvi , zci ) is a special regressor for (vi, ci) with large support condi-
tional on z−i . Then,
(i) if L = J , P
(
vi ≤ v, c∗i ≤ c∗|zi = z
)
is identified for every (v, c∗, z) ∈ supp(vi, c∗i , zi).
(ii) if L < J , P
(
c∗i ≤ c∗|zi = z
)
is identified for every (c∗, z) ∈ supp(c∗i , zi) and P
(
vi ≤ v|zi =
z
)
is identified for every (v, z) ∈ supp(vi, zi).
Proposition 5 (Identification of preferences with surely considered sets). Suppose that we observe
a special regressor for vi, named zvi , with a large support conditional on z
−
i . Suppose also that
Si ≡ S(zi) is constant with respect to zvi . Then,




is identified for all (v, zi) in its support.




is bounded within an interval of width P(|ri| = L, ri ∩ A =
∅|zvi = x, z−) for all (x, z,A) such that A ⊆ S(z) with |A| ≤ L.
2.5.2 Lemmas
These lemmas are used in the proofs of the observations and the propositions. I define that a school
is acceptable if vij > 0 and unacceptable if vij < 0.
Lemma 1. Consider a list r that contains an unacceptable school before an acceptable school,
and the lowest-ranked school is an acceptable school. Then, in any realization, r gives a weakly
less payoff than an alternative list that switches the lowest-ranked school unacceptable school
with the school that gives the maximum utility among the schools that follow this lowest-ranked
unacceptable school.20
20The lemma is similar to what appears in the proof of Proposition 3 (ii) in He (2017).
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Lemma 2 (Never write an unacceptable school). For any list r that contains a considered but
unacceptable school, there is an alternative list that contains no unacceptable school and gives
strictly higher expected utility.
2.5.3 Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1. By assumption, the list r has an unacceptable school before an acceptable
school. Let j− denote the lowest-ranked unacceptable school in the list. Then, by construction,
(1) there are some schools that follow j− and (2) these schools are all acceptable. Let the utility-
maximum of these school be indicated by jmax (and there is always such a school). Then, the report
r reads:
r = ( · · ·︸︷︷︸
A
, j−, · · ·︸︷︷︸
B
, jmax, · · ·︸︷︷︸
C
)
where A, B, and C denote the set of the schools in each respective position. Each of A, B, and C
may or may not be empty.
Consider an alternative list r′ that switches jmax with j−, as in the statement:
r′ = ( · · ·︸︷︷︸
A
, jmax, · · ·︸︷︷︸
B
, j−, · · ·︸︷︷︸
C
)
where the schools and the ordering within each A,B, and C is unaltered.
Representing an outcome in the relevant probability space by ω, I want to show that r′ weakly
dominates r for every ω, i.e., viµ(i;r)(ω) ≤ viµ(i;r′)(ω) for all ω, where µ(i; r) is the assignment
of i in the case that i reports r. To see this, suppose not: there is ω such that viµ(i;r)(r;ω) >
viµ(i;r′)(r
′;ω). Then, it must be that the student get rejected at all the A schools under this ω re-
gardless of submitting r or r′, i.e.,






where r(j) and r′(j) denote the ranks of school j in r and r′, respectively. This is because other-
wise, he gets into the same school regardless of reporting r or r′ and obtains the same utility. Note
that it is impossible that he gets rejected in one report but not in the other report - his scores for any
j ∈ A under the two reports are exactly the same in the two reports as the submitted rank of any
j ∈ A in the two reports are the same. This is because score is restricted to depend only depends
on certain aspects of the report - i.e., the rank.
Also, it must be that he gets rejected by j− under r. Otherwise, conditioning on that the student
is reject by all schools in A, this is the worst that can happen to him under r or r′ because B and
C can never have an unacceptable school by construction. Therefore, there is no way that j− will
strictly beat allocation under r′. Also, it must be that he gets rejected by jmax under r′; otherwise,
this is the best that can happen to him under r or r′ and so there is no way that allocation under r









Similarly, it must be that he fails to make the cutoffs (in either reports) by all schools in B.
Otherwise, he gets same utility under the two reports. Note that he makes the cutoff in any of these
schools in B by submitting r iff he does so in r′; the score for the school is the same under the two
reports.
Further, it must be that he is rejected by jmax under r and j− under r′. This follows from the



















By the same reasoning, it must be that he fails to make the cutoffs (in either reports) by all
schools in C. Otherwise, he gets same utility under the two reports. Note that he makes the cutoffs
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in all of these schools in B by submitting r iff he does so in r′; the scores are the same under the
two reports.
Then, they get rejected by all schools in either of the two reports, and is placed into outside
option, in which they derive the same utility. This contradicts viµ(i;r)(r;ω) > viµ(i;r′)(r′;ω) we
started with.
Proof of Lemma 2. I first show that, for any r that contains an unacceptable school, there is an
alternative list without any unacceptable school that gives weakly higher expected utility.
Suppose that r has an unacceptable school at the very end. Then, it is straightforward to verify
that dropping this school weakly increases expected utility. Repeat this process until the last school
is an acceptable school. If the list is now composed of only the acceptable schools (or is empty),
then such a list is an alternative list that we wanted to find.
If there are still some unacceptable schools in the list, then Lemma 1 can be applied as there is
some acceptable school after any unacceptable school. We further know that the new report found
by the lemma must give weakly higher expected utility, as we’ve claimed that for any outcome ω,
the new report must give utility weakly higher than the old report.
Apply the lemma to switch the lowest-ranked unacceptable school to a lower spot in the list. If
this schools is now in the last spot, then drop this. If not, the schools that appear after this lowest-
ranked unacceptable school are all acceptable, so that we can apply the lemma again. Continue to
apply this lemma, this unacceptable the school gets moved to the last spot, in which case we can
drop the unacceptable school and obtain even (weakly) higher expected utility.
If the resulting report is now filled with only acceptable schools (or is empty), we have found
an alternative list that we wanted to find. If not, repeat the aforementioned process of moving the
lowest-ranked unacceptable school down the list and then dropping it, until there is no unacceptable
schools in the list. Every such process gives weakly higher expected utility, and therefore the
resulting list gives weakly higher expected utility.
Note that the process above now has at least one occasion where an unacceptable but considered
school is dropped from the last slot. By assumption, a student believes he has positive chance of
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matching to a considered school upon listing. Therefore, this drop strictly increases his expected
utility.
Proof of Observation 1. Let L denote the maximum allowed length of the list. I show that the first
statement holds.
To show that j ∈ ri implies both j ∈ Ci and vij > 0, I show the contrapositive. First, if j /∈ Ci,
j cannot be on ri by definition of consideration. Second, suppose that vij < 0 and j ∈ Ci. By
Lemma 2, such a list with an unacceptable but considered school cannot be (subjectively) optimal.
Suppose now that vij > 0 and j ∈ Ci, but j /∈ ri. Then one can strictly gain by adding j on
the bottom of the list, which contradicts subjective optimality of ri. The strict relation comes from
j ∈ Ci; a considered school has (subjectively) positive admission chance upon listing. Addition of
a school is possible since ri has not exhausted all the available slots.
I now show that the second statement holds. The second statement is equivalent to the following
statement: ri has exactly L schools if and only if {j ∈ J |vij > 0, j ∈ Ci} has L schools or more.
Suppose first that |ri| = L but |{j ∈ J |vij > 0, j ∈ Ci}| < L. Because all schools in ri must
be considered by definition, there must be some schools in ri that is subjectively reachable but is
unacceptable. By Lemma 2, such a list cannot be subjectively optimal.
Suppose now that |{j ∈ J |vij > 0, j ∈ Ci}| ≥ L but |ri| < L. Then, there must be some
school j /∈ ri such that vij > 0 and j ∈ Ci. Adding j at the bottom of the list gives strictly higher
payoff, contradicting that ri is subjectively optimal.
Proof of Proposition 1. I implicitly condition everything on zi\(zvi , ai). Take any zv ∈ supp(zvi )
and the according ā ≡ (ā1(zv), · · · , āJ(zv)). Note that P(ci > 0|ā) = 1 implies P
(
ci > 0
∣∣∣zvi , ā) =
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1 almost surely. Then, almost surely,
P
(
j /∈ ri ∀j = 1, · · · , J
∣∣∣zvi = zv, ai = ā)
= P
(
cij < 0 or vij < 0 ∀j = 1, · · · , J
∣∣∣zv, ā) by proof of Observation 1 with generalized L
= P
(
vij < 0 ∀j = 1, · · · , J














. by ṽi |= zvi
As the first line is observed, the last line is identified almost surely for zv ∈ RJ by the large support
assumption on zvi . Then, by the independence assumptions on ai and z
v
i , P(vi > x|zv, a) = P(vi >
x|zv) = P(ṽi > x + zv). Therefore, P(vi > x|zv, a) = P(vi > x|z) is identified for almost every
(x, z) ∈ supp(vi, zi).
Proof of Proposition 2. I will implicitly condition everything on zi\zci . I first prove (i). Take any
zc ∈ supp(zci ). Note that
P
(




ci > 0, vi > 0













∣∣∣zc) by c̃i |= zci
but the first line is observed and P
(
vi > 0






is identified almost surely. By the assumptions on zci , P
(
ci > x






∣∣∣zc) is identified for almost all (x, zc) ∈ supp(ci, zci ). The result follows
from the definition of c∗i , i.e. c
∗
ij = 1(cij > 0) for all (i, j).
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The proof of (ii) follows analogously by noting that P
(
j ∈ ri ∀j ∈ A








∣∣∣zc) and that P(j ∈ ri ∀j ∈ A∣∣∣zci = zc) is observed while P((vij)j∈A >
0
∣∣∣zc) is assumed identified.
Proof of Proposition 3. Define v∗ij = vij
(
2 · 1(vij > 0, c∗ij = 1) − 1
)
. Note first that the assump-
tions imply the distribution of v∗i ≡ (vij)j∈J is known. Note also that arg maxr∈R(Ci) v · pr =
arg maxr∈R(J ) v
∗ · pr. Therefore, two beliefs p ≡ {prj}j∈J ,r∈R(J ) and p′ ≡ {p
′r
j }j∈J ,r∈R(J ) are
behaviorally equivalent if and only if for all v ∈ RJ , arg maxr∈R(J ) v · pr = arg maxr∈R(J ) v · p
′r.
Let Cr(p) ≡ {v ∈ RJ |r = arg maxr∈R(J ) v · pr} for each r ∈ R(J ). Then, two beliefs p and p′
are behaviorally equivalent if and only if Cr(p) = Cr(p′) for all r ∈ R(J ).
Proof under assumption (1): L = J = 2.
















.This can be checked by
noting that C∅(p) = {(v1, v2) ∈ R2|v1, v2 ≤ 0}, C(1)(p) = {(v1, v2) ∈ R2|v1 ≥ 0, v2 ≤ 0},
C(2)(p) = {(v1, v2) ∈ R2|v1 ≤ 0, v2 ≥ 0}, C(1,2)(p) = {(v1, v2) ≥ 0|v2/v1 ≤ δ, }, and C(2,1)(p) =
{(v1, v2) ≥ 0|v2/v1 ≥ δ}. By assumption, everyone (in the subgroup defined by the observables)
shares the common belief p = {prj}j∈J ,r∈R(J ) and therefore P({vi2/vi1 ≥ δ} ∩ {vi ≥ 0}) =
P(vi ∈ C(2,1)(p)) = P(ri = (2, 1)). As P(vi ≤ v) is known, the left-hand side of the equation is
calculable as a function of δ. On the other hand, the right-hand side is observable. Thus, belief is
identified.
Proof under assumption (2): L = 1.
By assumption, everyone has the same belief, which I denote by p. Note that C(j)(p) = {v ∈







vk} for j = 1, . . . , J and
C∅(p) = {(v1, v2) ∈ R2|v1, v2 ≤ 0}. Thus, the Cr(p)′s are completely characterized by the vector
p̃ ≡ (p̃2, · · · , p̃J) ≡ (p2p1 , . . . ,
pJ
p1
). Therefore, belief is identified if p̃ is identified.
I now claim that one can use Corollary 1 of Berry, Gandhi, and Haile (2013; BGH). In their




for j = 1, . . . , J . Note that the school j = 1 now plays the role of
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BGH’s “outside option” (which is denoted j = 0 in their notation).21 To see that the corollary
applies, note first that X is a Cartesian product. Moreover, σj(p̃) is strictly decreasing in p̃k for
all j = {1, . . . , J} and for all k 6= 1, j, as (1)
∑J
k=1 P(vi ∈ C(k)(p̃)) is constant over p̃, and (2)
P(vi ∈ C(j)(p̃)) is strictly decreasing because vi has full support. Thus, BGH’s Corollary 1 applies
and σ(p̃) is injective.
Proof of Proposition 4 . I first prove case (i). Take any z ≡ (zv, zc, z−) such that zv ∈ RJ , zc ∈ RJ ,
and z− ∈ supp(z−i ). Then,
P
(
j ∈ ri ∀j = 1, · · · , J |zvi = zv, zci = zc, z−i = z−
)
= P(ṽi − zv > 0, c̃i − zc > 0|zv, zc, z−)
= P(ṽi > z
v, c̃i > z
c|z−)
= P(−ṽi < −zv,−c̃i < −zc|z−)





last expression is identified for any such (zv, zc, z−). Thus, the joint distribution of (−ṽi,−c̃i)
conditional on z−i , and therefore the joint distribution of (ṽi, c̃i) conditional on z
−
i , is identified on
the support of z−i . As vi = ṽi − zvi and ci = c̃i − zci with (ṽi, c̃i) |= (zvi , zci )|z−i and zi ≡ (zvi , zci , z−i )
is observed, the joint distribution of (vi, ci) conditional on zi is identified for every zi in its support.
To show the first part of case (ii), note that
P
(
ri = ∅|zvi = zv, zci = zc, z−i = z−
)
= P(vij ≤ 0 or cij ≤ 0 ∀j ∈ J |zv, zc, z−)
= P(ṽij ≤ zvij or c̃ij < zcij ∀j ∈ J |z−)
Now, send all of the elements in zc to negative infinity. By the dominated convergence theorem,
21The outside option j = 0 as considered in my model is left out of the discussion here because their choice
probability does not change according to p.
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the last expression converges to P(ṽij ≤ zvij ∀j ∈ J |z−). Note that zvi is a special regressor for
vi with a large support. Use the special regressor similarly as before to identify the distribution of
vi. The second part of case (ii) follows similarly by sending all of the elements in zv to negative
infinity.
Proof of Proposition 5. Proof of part (i) follows by noting that
P(ri includes no school among S(zi) |zi = z)
= P((vij)j∈S(zi) ≤ 0|zi = z)
= P(ṽij ≤ zvij ∀j ∈ S(zi)|zvi = zv, z−i = z−)
= P((ṽij)j∈S(zi) ≤ (zvj )j∈S(zi)|z−i = z−)
and using the independence of the special regressor to recover the distribution of (vij)j∈S(zi)|zi.
I now show part (ii). Take zi = z andA ⊆ S(z) with |A| ≤ L. Implicitly condition everything
on z. Note that for any two events A and B, P(A|B)P(B) ≤ P(A) ≤ P(A|B)P(B) + P(Bc).
Consider the events A = {vij ≤ 0 ∀j ∈ A} and B = {|ri| = L, ri ∩ A = ∅}c. One can verify that
P(A|B) = P(j /∈ ri ∀j ∈ A|B) using Observation 2. Further, note that P(j /∈ ri ∀j ∈ A|B) and
P(B) is observable. Thus, P(A) ≡ P(vij ≤ 0 ∀j ∈ A) = P(ṽij ≤ zvij ∀j ∈ A) is bounded within








Empirical Analysis of New York City’s High
School Choice Procedure and its
Distributional Impacts
3.1 Introduction
This chapter examines the impacts of centralized public high school choice in New York City.
To do this, I first estimate a parametric version of the model of student applications considered
in Chapter 2. Then, I use the model to evaluate the impact of school choice on racial integration
and the likelihood that students are matched to their preferred schools across races. In particular,
the model is used to simulate counterfactual scenarios to measure the influences of different fac-
tors: residential locations, preferences, limited consideration sets, admission priority groups, and
the screening policies of the schools. The model is also used to quantify the degree of matching
stability.
3.2 Empirical Specification
This chapter uses a version of the model of student applications considered in Chapter 2. To bring
the model to the data, I make certain parametric restrictions.
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where xvj = (x
v
j1, · · · , xvjKx) denotes a vector of the observed school characteristics, ξ
v
j denotes
the unobserved common taste shifter for j, and zvij = (z
v
ij1, · · · , zvijKz) denotes a vector of the ob-
servable variables that vary across i, possibly including interaction terms between i− and j−level
characteristics, (i, j)-specific terms, and also i-specific terms. The idiosyncratic taste shock is rep-
resented by εvij ∼i.i.d N(0, 1), and I assume that it is independent of (xvj , ξvj , zvij).1 I also assume that
ξvj is independent of x
v
j .
2 The utilities vij are normalized in terms of both scale and location. The
scale is normalized by setting the standard deviation of εij equal to 1. The location is normalized
by setting the value of the outside option to zero, i.e., vi0 = 0. Thus, vij is interpreted as the utility
of j relative to 0. As I allow i−specific terms in zij , the value of the outside option relative to all
the inside options can vary across these student-level observables.
The observed school characteristics include average attendance and graduation rates, average
math achievement in middle school, ethnic composition, and ninth grade enrollment. The observed
student characteristics include subsidized lunch status, ethnicity, middle school math score, English
proficiency, neighborhood income, and special education status. The observed student-school spe-
cific characteristics include the distance from the student’s home to the school, and an indicator for
whether school j is applicant i’s middle school.
1The nonparametric identification results strongly suggest that I can allow richer forms of unobserved
heterogeneity—for example, allowing for random coefficients, or allowing εvij to be correlated across j’s.
2In relationship with this assumption, the paper does not currently interpret β as “causal.” The assumption may be
relaxed with instruments for potentially endogenous xj’s.
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c + εcij if j /∈ Si
+∞ if j ∈ Si
where Si denotes the surely considered set for applicant i, xcj = (xcj1, · · · , xcjKcx) denotes a vector of
observed school characteristics, zcij = (z
c
ij1, · · · , zcijKcz) denotes a vector of the observable variables
that vary across i, possibly including interaction terms between i− and j−level characteristics,
(i, j)-specific terms, and i-specific terms. The idiosyncratic taste shock is represented by εcij ∼i.i.d
N(0, 1),3 and I assume that it is independent of (xj, zcij).
4 The scale is normalized by setting the
variance of εcij equal to 1.
The observables (xcj, z
c





reflects the possibility that any observable that shifts utility may also shift consideration. On the
other hand, there may be variables that only enter (xcj, z
c




ij). In my specifications,
these variables reflect the order in which the school appears in the school directory within its bor-
ough, the high school’s distance from the applicant’s middle school, and the applicants’ admission
probabilities at the schools.
More specifically, the page rank variable records the order in which the school appears in
the NYC High School Directory (ranked within its borough), which is the main reference for
the application process and is more than 600 pages long. The schools are ordered alphabetically
within their respective boroughs in this directory. Because applicants may overlook the schools that
are listed later, the page rank may shift consideration. However, because the schools are ordered
alphabetically, it is argued that page rank is excluded from the preferences. Section 1.3.2 of Chapter
1 discussed how Table 1.3 is consistent with the hypothesis. Table 1.5 further showed that page rank
is largely uncorrelated with observable school characteristics.
3With the independence assumption, the model becomes an alternative-specific consideration model (Swait and
Ben-Akiva, 1987). For more discussion, see Abaluck and Adams (2017).
4The nonparametric identification results suggest that richer forms of unobserved heterogeneity can be allowed.
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I allow a school’s distance from an applicant’s middle school to affect consideration, as the
applicant may be more aware of the schools that are close to her middle school. I assume that
the distance can affect consideration only within a two-mile boundary. While it is plausible that a
student may prefer the schools that are close to her middle school because she expects her peers
from the middle school to attend these schools, one can control for the number of students enrolling
from the applicant’s middle school.
I also allow a proxy of the objective admission probability of a student at the school to affect
her consideration as it likely affects her assessment about whether she has a positive probability
of admission to the school. 5 The proxies of these probabilities are calculated conditional on the
applicant ranking the school first in their list. Table 1.3 of Chapter 1 supported the hypothesis
that admission priorities, which are correlated with admission chances, affect consideration but not
preferences conditional on observable school characteristics. I assume that the proxy probabilities
enter the consideration equation linearly.
Following the definition of the consideration set, the surely considered set is the intersection
of (1) the set of schools the applicant is surely aware of and (2) the set of schools that she surely
believes she has a positive chance of admission to upon application. My main specification assumes
that the applicant is surely aware of schools within a .75 mile from her home or a quarter mile
from her middle school. Additionally, I assume that the applicant surely believes she has some
chance of admission to any school that did not fill its seats in the previous year or has a program
such that she is in the first priority group and all of the students in the first priority group were
admitted in the previous year. This specification results in approximately five surely considered
schools per applicant on average. Note also that the surely considered sets are entirely determined
by observables.
Beliefs Beliefs about the probabilities of assignments to schools are derived from the beliefs
about the actual cutoffs and scores. A student’s anticipation regarding the actual diffij ≡ cutoffij−
5The proxy is set by Φ(cutoffij − ŝcoreij)/
√
(12)) where ŝcoreij is calculated using the estimated screening
policies and the admission priority groups.
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scoreij is represented by the random variable d̃iffij(k). I parametrize the distribution of d̃iffij(k)
by
d̃iffij(k) = cutoffij − scoreij + εbijk
≡ cutoffij − scoreij + βrank(k − 1) + µ(xbj, zbi ) + ηij︸ ︷︷ ︸
:=δdiffijk
+νij





the idiosyncratic bias heterogeneity ηij ∼ N(0, σ2η), and student i’s doubt in assessment νij . From
the perspective of the student, his subjective assessment d̃iffijk follows distribution N(δdiffijk, σ
2
ν). In
other words, δdiffijk is the mean anticipated difference between the cutoff and score for agent i, and
σν represents the agent’s level of doubt about his assessment.
The specification captures a variety of relevant scenarios. When βrank = 0, subjectively optimal
lists are truthfully ordered in terms of utilities among the listed schools. This represents the correct
understanding of a core property of DA: the scores do not depend on the submitted ranks, and
therefore untruthful ordering within the listed schools is a weakly dominated strategy (Fack et al.,
2019). However, this does not imply that students’ reports are necessarily truthful (in a strong
sense), as some unranked schools may be preferred to some of the ranked schools, even among
those within the applicant’s consideration set. On the other hand, if βrank 6= 0, the submitted
rankings may not be truthfully ordered in terms of utilities even among the listed schools. When
σ2ν = ∞, the subjectively optimal lists are always truthful: students rank the schools truthfully
among the considered schools that are preferred to the outside option until they exhaust all the
12 slots. This implies that ranked schools are always preferred to any considered but unranked
school. Such completely truthful behavior may be objectively suboptimal when the list truncation
binds. The model can approximate equilibrium beliefs when βrank = 0 and the distribution of
µ(xbj, z
b
i )+ηij +νij approximates the randomness in the actual (pre-realization) cutoffij−scoreij .
In NYC, a student’s score for a school program may depend on the student’s admission priority
group for the program, the school program’s evaluation of the student based on factors such as past
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performance, and admission lotteries. Only certain school programs are allowed to screen students
based on past performance.
With the specifications, it follows that











and this relationship and Equation 2.2.2 are used to express prij as a function of the belief parameters
and an unobservable ηij .
3.3 Estimating Preferences, Consideration, and Beliefs
Section 3.3.1 describes the estimation procedure. Section 3.3.2 provides the summary of estimation
results.
3.3.1 Estimation
The main results are estimated with the generalized method of moments. The main source of
the data is the administrative data provided by the NYC DOE for the 2016–2017 academic year,
as explained in Section 1.3.1 of Chapter 1. Two types of moment conditions are used: the first
type is derived from a partial likelihood, and the second type is simulated moments. The first
type of moment conditions is the scores of the (partial) likelihood of inclusion of school j in
applicant i’s report. With regards to the identification results in Chapter 2, the likelihood reflects
the identifying information in Observations 1 and 2 or, more formally, that in Proposition and 1 and
2.6 Accordingly, they give information about preferences and consideration but not about beliefs.
In the likelihood, the sample consists only the (i, j) pairs such that |ri\{j}| < 11; with a slight
abuse of notation, |ri\{j}| denotes the number of schools in the report ri after excluding j from the
6I also weight (i, j) pairs for which i surely considers j, so that such pairs have a combined weight of 15% in the
sample. In the current specification, such (i, j) pairs constitute only approximately 1% of the sample; I amplify their
importance by weighting.
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report if it was listed. That is, I select student-school pairs for which the j−excluded ri has less than
eleven schools. As |ri\{j}| < 11 implies |ri| < 12, the condition selects applicants who have not
exhausted the list, consistent with the statement in Observations 1 and 2 of Chapter 2. Selecting
(i, j) pairs with |ri\{j}| < 11, rather than |ri| < 12, resolves the potential selection problem
discussed with regards to Observation 2 of Chapter 2; under the specification of the distribution of
(εij)j∈J laid out in Section 3.2, one can show that |ri\{j}| < 11 is independent of εij so that the
distribution of the unobservables are unaffected by such selection. The exact moment conditions
are provided in Appendix 3.6.2.
The second type of the moment conditions is derived from the students’ ranking behavior and
the identities of the schools in the full lists, which provide information about all the channels: pref-
erences, consideration, and beliefs. These moment conditions either reflect the covariance of the
observed characteristics with an indicator for a school being listed in the first top k ∈ {1, · · · , 12}
slots by an applicant or with an indicator for a school being listed in the first top k slots by an appli-
cant while another school not being included in these slots by the same applicant. With regards to
the identification results in Chapter 2, these moment conditions use the identifying information in
Observation 3 or, more formally, that in Proposition 3. The exact moment conditions are provided
in Appendix 3.6.2. They are simulated moments, and I smooth these moments via importance
sampling following Ackerberg (2009).
3.3.2 Estimates
I present a summary of the key features of the estimated parameters in Table 3.1 (parameter es-
timates are presented in Tables 3.3 and 3.4). Regardless of ethnicity, the students are estimated
to consider approximately 15% schools on average, which is about 65 schools in NYC. There is
a notable difference across races in the proportion of schools considered among schools that are
(counterfactually) preferred to the outside option—Asian and White students are much more likely
to consider their preferred schools. This reflects both the fact that (1) White and Asian students
tend to have fewer schools preferred to the outside option, potentially reflecting the fact that these
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Figure 3.1: Performance of Preferred and Considered Schools by Ethnicity
(a) Probability of Being Preferred to the Outside Option
(b) Probability of Being Considered
Notes: For each ethnicity, each point in the scatter plot denote a school. Each line represents a cubic
polynomial fit. College/career rate indicates the school’s proportion of students who graduated from
high school four years after they entered 9th grade and then enrolled in college, a vocational program,
or a public service program within six months of graduation.
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Table 3.1: Summary of Preference and Consideration
Asian Black Hispanic White
% Schools considered 14.2% 15.6% 13.2% 14.7%
% Schools considered outside the surely considered set 13.9% 14.8% 12.4% 14.3%
% Schools considered among schools preferred to outside option 33.0% 15.8% 12.7% 27.8%
% Students who exhaust 12 slots without any surely considered school 3.5% 3.9% 2.4% 0.5%
% Schools preferred to outside option 4.8% 10.6% 11.2% 3.9%
% Schools preferred to outside option among surely considered schools 14.5% 10.3% 11.2% 13.7%
% Schools preferred to outside option among considered schools 14.5% 10.9% 11.6% 8.2%
% Schools both considered and preferred to outside option 1.5% 1.7% 1.6% 1.2%
students have better outside options, and (2) White and Asian students tend to live closer to higher-
quality schools (see Figures 1.1 and 1.2). Students who exhaust all the 12 slots almost always write
some surely considered school on the list. Schools that are both considered and preferred to the
outside option is around 1.5% across races.
Figure 3.1 further demonstrates a summary of the estimates. For each ethnicity, a point in the
scatter plots represents a school in NYC. The lines represent cubic polynomial fits. In Figure 3.1a,
compared to Asian and White students, Black and Hispanic students are more likely to prefer low-
performing high schools to their outside options. This can be explained by Black and Hispanic
students tending to have worse outside options and to live closer to lower-performing schools (see
Figures 1.1 and 1.2 in Chapter 1). On the other hand, the probability of high-performing schools
being preferred to the outside options is similar across the races. Figure 3.1b shows that Asian
and White students are more likely to consider high-performing schools, partly because they live
closer to such schools; distance is an important determinant of consideration probabilities (see
Table 3.4). Later versions of the draft will include discussions about estimates of beliefs about
admission chances.
51
Table 3.2: Definition of the Matchings
A. Matchings without school choice
Matching Matching method
Random Random allocation of students to the schools
Neighborhood Minimize total distance traveled by the students to the schools
B. Matchings with school choice
Matching Simulated? Strategizing Consideration Sets Admission rankings Preferences
Actual No Actual Actual Actual Actual
Estimated + Truthtelling Yes Truthtell Estimated Actual adm. priorities
+ Estimated screening
Estimated
Add Full Consideration Yes Truthtell All schools Actual adm. priorities
+ Estimated screening
Estimated
Add Random Screening Yes Truthtell All schools Actual adm. priorities
+ Random screening
Estimated
Add Random Admission Priorities
(Preferences-Only Choice)
Yes Truthtell All schools Random adm. priorities
+ Random screening
Estimated
3.4 The Impacts of Centralized School Choice in Practice
Section 3.4.1 presents the impact of NYC’s high school choice on racial integration and the pro-
portion of students matched to their preferred schools. It also decomposes the overall impact into
the contributions of different factors. Section 3.4.2 quantifies the prevalence of justified envy. It
also presents the steps necessary to quantify report optimality and truthfulness.
3.4.1 Distributional Outcomes and Decomposition
This section analyzes the impact of school choice on the distributional outcomes. The two dis-
tributional outcomes that I focus on are (1) racial integration and (2) the proportion of students
matched to their top five preferred schools by each race. I further decompose the overall impact
of school choice into the impacts of different factors—students’ preferences, limited consideration
sets, strategic mistakes, admission priority groups, and screening of the students by the schools.
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To do this, I consider the actual and the counterfactual matchings as in Table 3.2. There are
two counterfactual matchings without school choice: random matching and neighborhood match-
ing. Random matching randomly allocates the students to the schools, respecting the capacity
constraints of the schools. Neighborhood matching minimizes the total distance traveled by the
students to the schools while respecting the capacity constraints of the schools.7
There are five matchings based on school choice: one is the actual matching, and the four others
represent counterfactual matchings simulated under different scenarios. 8 Actual matching is the
actual school choice matching in 2017 from the main round. Estimated + Truthtelling matching
represents the results from a simulated DA where the students have estimated preferences and con-
sideration but are not strategic: students truthfully report their considered schools in the order of
their preferences until they run out of the schools that are preferred to the outside option or reach
the 12-school threshold. In this matching, schools rank students based on the admission priority
groups and the estimated screening policies.9 In the last three matchings, I shut off each factor’s
influence one by one and simulate the DA assignments. Compared to the Estimated + Truthtelling
matching, Add Full Consideration matching turns off limited consideration by assuming that stu-
dents consider every school. Add Random Screening matching turns off the schools’ screening
policies by forcing the screening schools to randomly screen students. Add Random Admission
Priority matching turns off the effect of the existing admission priority groups by randomly al-
locating the students to the priority groups. Note that this matching purely reflects preferences
7Since some schools are dropped from the dataset due to missing data, and since I match every student in the
dataset (including those who remain unmatched in the data) in random matching and neighborhood matching, schools
do not have enough capacities to fit in every student. I proportionally expand the school capacities to have just enough
seats for the students.
8The simulations are done with 20,000 simulated applicants. The capacities of the schools are scaled to reflect
smaller number of total applicants.
9This matching is the current version of the most fully-fledged model. Actual matching and the
Estimated + Truthtelling matching are different in two ways: (1) they reflect the modeling and estimation errors, and
(2) I impose that students are truthtelling in the latter matching. The screening policies were separately estimated for
each screening program by regressing whether and where the student was ranked by a program using a linear model of
statewide mathematics test score, ELA test score, days absent, and days late. Admission priority groups were estimated
using the information on middle school of the applicant, the borough of the applicant’s home address, and whether the
applicant lives in the zoned area. The applicants were assumed to have attended the information sessions.
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without the influences of limited consideration, strategic behavior, nor admission priorities. In this
regard, an alternative name for the matching is Preference-Only Choice.
Racial Integration
Figure 3.2: Percent of Own Ethnicity by Matching, Model-Free
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Notes: For each ethnicity and matching, the plot represents the kernel-smoothed density of the students with
the same ethnicity in the students’ assigned schools. See Table 3.2 and the discussions for the definitions of the
matchings.
For each ethnicity, Figure 3.2 shows the density of the students matched to schools with dif-
ferent proportions of the students from their ethnicity. The figure shows that the main round of
school choice tends to integrate ethnicities compared to the counterfactual neighborhood alloca-
tion; school choice tends to reduce the cases of students attending schools where their peers are
mostly of their own ethnicity, with a possible exception for the Whites. However, the ethnicities are
still substantially more isolated under the school choice allocation compared to the counterfactual
case of random matching, which represents the scenario of full integration.
I then analyze which factors contribute to or hamper racial integration and by how much. Fig-
ure 3.3 shows the isolation index of each ethnicity by matching. For each ethnicity, the isolation
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Figure 3.3: Isolation Indices by Matching
Notes: Each bar represents isolation index of an ethnic group in a matching. See Table 3.2 and the discussions for
the definitions of the matchings.
index denotes the average percentage of the students of the same ethnicity in a school; in other
words, it is the mean of the corresponding distribution represented in Figure 3.2. Therefore, higher
isolation indices of ethnicities indicate higher degrees of segregation. We observe that limitations
in consideration tend to segregate; assuming full consideration, each ethnicity’s isolation index
decreases. Furthermore, we observe that the schools’ ranking policies tend to segregate. Replacing
the estimated screening policies by random screening, the isolation indices decrease; replacing the
actual admission priorities with random priorities has a similar effect.
Welfare and Equity
Each bar in Figure 3.4 depicts the fraction of students who are matched to their top five pre-
ferred schools in terms of each student’s simulated utility uij , for each ethnicity and match-
ing. The sample includes both the schools that are considered and not considered. Viewing the
Estimated + Truthtelling matching as an approximation to the current school choice matching,10
10Such approximation is only justified when truthtelling approximates the students’ reporting strategy. A better
approximation would be to use the assignments simulated using the estimated beliefs.
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we see that school choice tends to increase the proportion of students matched to their top five
preferred schools compared to the neighborhood matching. The improvement is large: it increases
such proportion from about 6.1% to 35.1% on average. We see that Asian and White students are
more likely to be matched to their preferred schools compared to Black and Hispanic students in
a neighborhood allocation, reflecting the disparities in the neighborhood schools’ characteristics
across races, as seen in Figures 1.1 and 1.2. We also see that limited consideration substantially
suppresses the proportion of students matched to their preferred schools, but the effect is larger
for the Hispanic and Black students. The latter can be explained by the fact that Asian and White
students tend to consider high-performing schools, as seen in Figures 3.1b and 3.6. The results
suggest that schools’ screening policies are more likely to place Asian and White students to their
preferred schools. This potentially reflects the fact that Asian and White students tend to have bet-
ter performance in middle school (see, e.g., Table 1.1) so that they may be more likely to have
higher admission scores for the schools that can screen students. We also see that the admission
priority groups tend to place more Asian and White students to their preferred schools. This may
reflect that a large proportion of the admission priorities are based on geographic proximity. Since
Asian and White students live closer to higher-performing schools, they tend to be prioritized for
admissions in these schools.
3.4.2 Empirical Assessments of the Theory-Predicted Outcomes
Matching Stability and Justified Envy
To quantify matching stability, I count the cases of justified envy; a stable matching does not have
any case of justified envy. A student views a school with justified envy if the student and the school
are not matched to each other, but both would prefer to be matched to one another than to (one of)
the current assignment(s).11 In this definition, I interpret schools’ coarse admission priorities over
11The definition is in line with the usage of the term in the literature.
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Figure 3.4: Proportion Matched to Top Five Preferred Schools
Notes: Each bar represents the fraction of the students matched to their top five preferred schools. The sample
includes both the schools that are considered and those that are not. See Table 3.2 and the discussions for the
definitions of the matchings.
the students as their preferences.12 Unlike admission lottery or screening rankings, information on
the admission priorities is available to the applicants at the time of application. Using the simulation
results from Estimated + Truthtelling model, I show that the students have significant amounts of
justified envy; on average, they view about 8.7 schools with justified envy.13 There are also racial
disparities. Figure 3.5 depicts the number of schools viewed with justified envy by ethnicity. We see
that Black and Hispanic students tend to have more schools viewed with justified envy compared
to Asian and White students;14 on average, Black and Hispanic students view approximately 10.4
schools with justified envy while Asian and White students view 5.5 schools with such envy. This
partly reflects the fact that Asian and White students tend to be matched to their preferred schools,
as in Figure 3.4.
12When a school has multiple programs, I used the priorities of the program with the most seats.
13The interpretation implicitly assumes that students are truthtelling.
14More sensitivity checks are needed to confirm the robustness of this finding.
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Figure 3.5: Number of Schools Viewed With Justified Envy
Notes: Each line represents the kernel density of the number of schools viewed with justified envy for students
from each ethnic group.
Reports’ Optimality and Truthfulness
The following procedure enables quantification of the proportion of the reports that are truthful
or optimal. One first simulates the reports based on the students’ estimated preferences, consider-
ation, and beliefs. Then, based on simulated preference and consideration, one can calculate the
fraction of the reports that are truthfully ordered among the considered schools. Similarly, based
on simulated preference and the equilibrium admission probabilities, one can quantify what pro-
portion of the reports are optimal in terms of equilibrium admission probabilities. It is also possible
to quantify these outcomes separately for different demographic groups.
3.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, I use data on school applications and admissions from the NYC DOE for the
2016–2017 academic year to examine the impacts of the centralized public high school choice
procedure in NYC. I first analyze its impact on distributive outcomes. The results show that, com-
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pared to neighborhood allocation, school choice slightly improves racial integration and signifi-
cantly increases the proportion of students matched to their preferred schools across all races. I
further quantify the contributions of different factors. I find that admission priorities and screening
policies tend to segregate races. They make it more likely for the Asian and White to be matched
to their preferred schools. I also find that limitations in consideration tend to segregate races and
make it less likely for students of all races to be matched to their preferred schools.
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3.6 Appendix
3.6.1 Additional Figures and Tables
Table 3.3: Preference Parameter Estimates
Asian Black Hispanic White
High is middle 2.50 (0.22) 2.07 (0.10) 2.39 (0.10) 2.23 (0.22)
Average grade 8 math 0.31 (0.18) 0.14 (0.03) 0.15 (0.04) 0.16 (0.07)
College/career rate 0.08 (0.47) 0.82 (0.11) 0.48 (0.14) -0.15 (0.37)
9th grade seats 0.23 (0.03) 0.22 (0.02) 0.21 (0.03) 0.15 (0.02)
Distance to school -0.08 (0.04) -0.01 (0.01) -0.03 (0.02) -0.10 (0.02)
Proportion Asian -0.51 (0.20) -2.03 (0.13) -1.58 (0.18) -0.93 (0.21)
Proportion Black -1.97 (0.41) -1.76 (0.07) -1.70 (0.16) -2.06 (0.29)
Proportion Hispanic -1.52 (0.37) -1.68 (0.10) -1.36 (0.10) -1.61 (0.28)
Proportion White -0.55 (0.18) -1.46 (0.16) -0.36 (0.24) 1.87 (0.36)
Standard deviation of εvij 1 1 1 1
No. surely considered student-school pairs 2,030 7,693 11,505 1,966
No. student-school pairs 524,051 826,826 1,286,758 508,981
Notes: High is middle is an indicator variable reflecting that the middle school is the same school as the high school that
the applicant is applying to. College/career rate indicates the proportion of students who graduated from high school
four years after they entered 9th grade and then enrolled in college, a vocational program, or a public service program
within six months of graduation.
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Table 3.4: Consideration Parameter Estimates
Asian Black Hispanic White
Borough match 0.98 (0.31) 1.28 (0.07) 1.12 (0.09) 1.25 (0.19)
Close to middle school 3.23 (1.27) 7.42 (0.31) 2.98 (3.77) 1.12 (0.31)
Average grade 8 math 0.10 (0.24) 0.12 (0.04) 0.03 (0.04) 0.45 (0.14)
College/career rate 0.77 (0.75) 0.68 (0.17) 1.10 (0.19) 0.50 (0.74)
9th grade seats 0.02 (0.05) -0.01 (0.02) 0.02 (0.03) 0.09 (0.03)
Distance to school -0.15 (0.04) -0.10 (0.01) -0.10 (0.01) -0.11 (0.02)
Page rank 0.00 (0.02) -0.09 (0.01) -0.07 (0.01) 0.01 (0.02)
Proxy probability of admission -0.07 (0.04) 0.04 (0.01) 0.03 (0.01) -0.07 (0.03)
Proportion Asian -1.28 (0.46) -2.02 (0.15) -2.30 (0.16) -3.24 (0.38)
Proportion Black -1.03 (0.72) -0.92 (0.12) -1.99 (0.20) -0.99 (0.64)
Proportion Hispanic -0.54 (0.74) -1.42 (0.15) -1.16 (0.16) -0.11 (0.68)
Proportion White -1.45 (0.68) -2.09 (0.14) -2.55 (0.13) -2.83 (0.36)
Standard deviation of εbij 1 1 1 1
No. of surely considered student-school pairs 2,030 7,693 11,505 1,966
Number of student-school pairs 524,051 826,826 1,286,758 508,981
Notes: Borough match is an indicator variable reflecting that the student’s home and the high school are located in the
same borough. College/career rate indicates the proportion of students who graduated from high school four years after
they entered 9th grade and then enrolled in college, a vocational program, or a public service program within six months
of graduation.
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Figure 3.6: Characteristics of Considered Schools by Ethnicity
Notes: College/career rate indicates the proportion of students who graduated from high school four years after they




Likelihood of Inclusion and the Score Moments
I first derive the log-likelihood of inclusion of school j in the report of applicant i. The log-
likelihood reflects the identifying information in Observations 1 and 2. It “selects” individuals
with sij = 1(|ri\{j}| < 11) for the reasons explained in Section 3.3.1; note that, given that
(εij)j∈J is i.i.d across j, |ri\{j}| < 11 is independent of εij conditional on observables (xj, zi).
Let sij = 1(|ri\{j}| < 11). I drop conditioning on observables (xj, zi). Then,
log ΠiΠj:sij=1P(j ∈ ri|sij = 1)
= log ΠiΠj:sij=1,j /∈Si
(
1− P(vij > 0)P(cij > 0)
)1−1(j∈ri)(P(vij > 0)P(cij > 0))1(j∈ri) · · ·
Πj:sij=1,j∈Si
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where Φ̄(·) := 1−Φ(·), ψvij := vij− εvij , and ψcij := cij− εcij . Note that, for notational convenience,
the dependence of ψvij on preference parameters denoted θ
v and the dependence of ψcij on θ
c have
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As the sample size of (i, j) pairs such that i surely considers j is small relatively those that do
not have the sure-consideration relationship, in some specifications I weight the sure-consideration





























for some weights wNSC and wSC. It can be shown that the true parameters maximize the population
version of the weighted likelihood. The “scores” of the weighted log-likelihood can be obtained
analogously.
Simulated Ordering Moments




∣∣∣zi] = E[f(ri)− E[f(r(zi, ei; θ0))|zi]∣∣∣zi]
where ei denotes the vector of unobservables (εvi , ε
c
i , ηi), θ denotes the parameter vector, θ0 denotes
the true parameter vector, and r(zi, ei; θ) denotes the subjectively optimal report under (zi, ei, θ)
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where h(zi) may be a m−dimensional vector.




























where the distribution of esi is completely governed by θ0 and not by zi due to independence. I use





)∣∣zi] following Ackerberg (2009).








1(j ∈ rki )− P
(




= 0 ∀k = 1, . . . , 12
where rki is represents the report ri truncated up to the kth slot, r
k(·) is the equivalent for the
simulated report, and the set inclusion notation is used towards rki and r
k(·) with a slight abuse.
The condition uses f(ri) = 1J
(
1(j ∈ rki )
)
j∈J in the notation of equation 3.6.1. The moment
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1, zij, (zij − z̄i), z2ij, (zij − z̄i)2
)
j∈J .
Note that these moments amount to comparing within-i covariance of
(
1(j ∈ rki ), h(zij)
)
between
observed reports and (average of) simulated reports.
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